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What's Wrong With Modern Legal Education?

S

Dean John G. Hervey*

that the size of a man is measured by
the size of the things that he will let bother him. Which is to
say, that what concerns the legal profession, and those who
aspire to enter it, is the adequacy of the job that is being done.
The great majority of the lawyers have had training in the law
schools of the country-very few come to the practice today via
law office study. The practicing profession is, therefore, but the
mirror that reflects the schools in which the lawyers were trained.
If the bench and the bar give back distorted images of justice, it
is only because the schools have failed to inspire devotion to high
ideals and have not shown them the paths of true nobility, intellectual greatness, and real culture.
One thing which should ever command your interest as
alumni is your Law School. It is a part of you-you are an integral part of it. It belongs to you and the graduates who have
gone before. Its concern should be your concern and its problems
should be your problems. And the institution will be judged by
your performance. Your success, your leadership, and your professional stature cannot but reflect credit or discredit upon the
school. I should hope, therefore, that one of the things which will
bother you in the years ahead, regardless of whether it be convenient or not, would be the welfare of the school in which you
have been trained.
Another thing which should ever intrigue your interest is
the problems of the profession. The stature of the profession can
never rise higher than that of its component members. You will
be a part of it-it will be a part of you. And both the profession
OME ONE ONCE OBSERVED
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and the practitioner will succeed only as they respond to the
solution of the problems of the day.
There is an ancient rabbinical story of Sandalphon, the angel
of prayer, who stands on the ladder of light that Jacob saw in a
dream. From the world below there rises the supplications of
the weary and the troubled masses. The angel listens and
gathers the prayers together and they turn into flowers. Their
fragrance is wafted through the gates and down the streets of
the celestial city. In like manner, as it were, the individual
practitioners and the profession as a whole, sense the yearnings
of the people for justice and mercy. They turn to us for compassion and understanding. We are the ministers of justice. We
stand nearest to the sources of right. It behooves us, therefore,
ever to be compassionate and understanding. For in that way
we can leave the profession, when we depart, upon a higher
plane of usefulness than when we entered it.
Permit me now to move from the particular to the general
because, as a member of the profession, your interest will encompass all schools. There is a fancy in many quarters that legal
education today is generally excellent. Even national bar presidents have said that our law schools are much advanced over
the past-both in content and methodology and that our graduates are better fitted, both in theory and skill, to cope with the
legal problems of the day. The defenders of the law schools are
legion. The evidences of progress are voluminous.
On the other hand, a sizeable segment of the profession is
equally sure that our schools do less than is possible in preparing
their graduates for successful practice. The advocacy of the late
Jerome Frank for "lawyer schools" rather than "law-teacher
schools" and the very frank criticisms of (the late) Mr. Chief
Justice Arthur Vanderbilt and Judge Herbert Goodrich with
respect to the orientation and content of legal education should
not be dismissed lightly. Judge Goodrich recently summed up
his unease in these words:
• . * the (curricular) revision has tended to go too far
in cutting down time allotted for what we used to call the
fundamental common-law subjects in favor of the newer
and fancier ones. It may be granted that federal taxation
occupies such an important place in the economy of all of
us that some knowledge of the structure and working of
income taxation, at least, has to be made known to the
student. That does not mean that three or four courses are
necessary for this purpose nor does it mean that there is
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the slightest hope of turning out a man with his tax law
up to date.
* . , undergraduate legal instruction should be fundamentally common law instruction and without it the student
is inadequately prepared. Three years is not long enough
for everything and making a choice may be painful but it is
inevitable. I submit that we have too much of which is of
lesser importance.
I venture to suggest that the reconciliation of these points
of view lies not so much in emphasis on what is taught as in how
it is taught. In training members of the bar for practice in the
latter half of the twentieth century, it is not the substantive
content of legal education nor skills training, as such, which
should primarily provide the rallying point for the efforts of any
law school. With the dynamic quality of our Anglo-American
system and its Phoenix-like quality of re-making itself from its
own ruins, it is more important that the law schools and lawyers
reflect the notion of a current jurisprudente as a point in the continuum of a constantly evolving institution. The law graduate
of today should acquire the sense of relationship between the
past and the future, with the two producing at any given point
in time a synthesis which enables the legal system to solve social
problems without shocking the common sense of the community.
In acquiring this perspective, the lawyer should gain also a
knowledge of the rules of the past and of their growth and development into those of the present and the future. But the
study of the common law should be a part of the methodology of
the growth of the law as a social institution rather than dogma
which count as articles of faith.
This belief is consistent with current attitudes among law
teachers, but its implementation is not as effectively accomplished
as they would proclaim. We are accustomed to think in terms
of courses, or sequences of courses, or programs composed of
subjects. We are thus still largely fettered to notions of content.
The most prevalent method of solving the problem, one of giving
recognition to the existence of new jural problems, is that of
filling an already overfilled vessel-to impose an overlay of new
courses, such as, perhaps, renegotiation of government contracts,
world law, or international taxation, to mention three of the
more recent additions, without in most instances doing anything
much about the underlying basic curricular structure. To relieve
the pressure on the base, there are the alternatives of calling the
overlay "electives." This puts them in competition with each
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other for the student's time, or else making some room for them
by stealing an hour here and there from some already existing
course either directly or combining two or more existing courses.
But whatever the method of curriculum reorganization, and
whatever its announced motivation, there remains an unconscious
attachment to substantive content.
We recognize that there are practical difficulties in escaping
from preoccupation with content. While the purpose and function of modern legal education may be perfectly articulated, the
materials for its blueprinting are still largely primitive. Casebooks generally are concerned with the substance and structure
of a particular segment of the content of law, and without detracting from the excellence of law school training in analytical
and analogical reasoning, or the sense of relevance and the other
intellectual habits that the American lawyers exhibit, the day
to day work of the classrooms is largely concerned with the
narrow substance of a 15articular course.
The law schools also are sensitive to criticism from the
bench and bar, particularly in the areas of skills and practical
training. Also, the law school faculties are ofttimes swayed by
those who hold the purse strings. No matter how firmly crystallized a particular local rule may have become and no matter
how easily it may be learned through the simple expedient of
picking up a hornbook, few law teachers, aware of the predilection of the local board of bar examiners for certain questions,
will neglect to spend a few minutes on it, despite its purely informational character, and despite his awareness that it steals
precious time from the more immediate and central task.
Personally, I do not accept the thesis that the lawyers of
today are better trained, both with respect to theoretical and
practical skills, than their predecessors. There is no compelling
evidence that the product of today's law schools is any better
equipped, relatively, to grapple with the solution of the problems
which he is being required to face than the graduates of a generation ago were with theirs. While there have been marked, and
sometimes, notable changes in courses and materials, the techniques of legal education have altered little during the past
generation. The advances made have been no more than sufficient to maintain legal proficiency in the same relative position
with respect to social, economic and political institutions and
disciplines. Indeed, the latter give evidence of a speed of growth
and development which may make legal training and institutions
lag behind. Therefore, while I see no immediate cause for alarm
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with respect to the efficacy of legal education, neither do I see
any cause for rejoicing.
One century's saevilege may well be another's archeology.
Which is to say that there are areas in which the law schools are
doing rather less well currently than formerly. One such is the
area of advocacy. In the concentration of the schools in producing lawyers who are fitted to handle intricate technical problems there has been over-emphasis on the law and under-emphasis on the lawyer. The best of the graduates from many
schools go either into the higher echelons of government service,
legal or political, or into the large city offices where the bulk of
practice revolves around our economic life. There is the tacit, if
unexpressed, premise that court appearances are to be avoided,
as if advocacy were something shameful. As a result, the
criminal bar is entirely neglected. It is left by default to the
less swift in the race for fame and fortune. The leaders of the
bar are largely business advisors-to quote Morris Ernst, "The
The defense of propdefense of liberty has lost its prestige ....
erty pays better not only in dollars but in public esteem."
This development may be symptomatic of a hidden illness
legal
education. In bringing the law graduate to a peak of
in
technical excellence-and I mean this in no narrow sense of
mere mechanical proficiency but rather in the wider sense of
having him aware of the relevancy of the social, economic, and
political factors which make up the context of today's legal
matters-we have, nevertheless, as one writer has put it, concentrated on a system of legal education that has placed greater
emphasis on know how rather than on know why. Thus the
legal mind of today, though still tough and contentious, seems
more narrow-gauged than it was fifty years ago. It may well
be that in the very process of broadening the scope of the modern law graduate's training to include extensive familiarity with
the behavioral sciences and other peripheral disciplines which
are necessary to a lawyer's complete understanding of the social
order which he is to serve, that we have destroyed something
of the esprit d'corps which has characterized the profession from
time immemorial and has rendered the lawyer unique among
the professions; that in turning him into a very modern legal
eagle, to paraphrase Messrs. Gilbert & Sullivan, we have done
so at the expense of the spirit of public service which is, or
should be, the first article of the lawyer's faith.
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It may be presumptuous of me to attempt to interpret Judge
Goodrich, but I think that a more accurate articulation of his
dismay would consist in the recognition of this subtle, unconscious, shift in emphasis in the role of the lawyer in society
rather than to any dilution or debasement of the common law
curriculum as such. There is no magic in the alleged dichotomy
between "basic" or "common law" subjects and "specialties."
All professional education is specialized education. The former
are merely the specialties of an older day when practice was
mainly concerned with torts and contracts, with bills of exchange
and wills minus tax consequences, with issue rather than notice
pleading. The study of law, at least as far back as the inception
of the case system of study, has always been the study of
specialties. Pedagogically, there has been a utilization of the
traditional-the torts-contracts-property-procedure complex as
the teeth-cutting courses in the American law schools-and since
the early approach of the case method was largely an historical
and analytical one, these courses have served as the vehicles for
the initiation of the neophyte into the history and mysteries of
his profession. This is a matter of historical accident rather than
intrinsic quality. In England, for example, at least, tolerable results are obtained by starting the student out with such courses
as Roman Law, International Law, Constitutional Law, etc., and
leaving most of the "common law" subjects to await the second
and later years. The British employ those subjects in much the
same way that the American law schools use their first year
program.
How to preserve the continuity of the professional tradition
of the lawyer and how to equip him to resolve juridical problems which are too modern to reflect any traditional context is'
the problem which the law schools must face. It is a problem
rather than a dilemma. We must recognize that the lawyer who
knows how to reorganize a corporation will probably be more
socially useful in the future than the one who knows how to
replevy a T. V. set. And it may be that where a choice has to
be made, painful though it be, the former should be preferred.
An evolving civilization must have its casualties, and the structure of the curriculum will continue to cast off its more dispensable parts and acquire others deemed of greater significance
to the society of which the law is both the restraining and the
helping hand. No one mourns the disappearance of Bailments
and Carriers, for example, from the courses of instruction. We
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shall all become reconciled in time to more careful pruning of
additional areas of content.
The solution to the problem lies in awakening law faculties
to the paramount necessity of transmitting to law students an
awareness of the law as an historical and social continuum,
creating and recreating itself in a ceaseless evolutionary process;
always different and always the same; an awareness that the
lawyer is the catalyst and not merely the broker of society; that
his traditional role is not merely that of the "Hessian soldier
available to whomever would seek his counsel or engage his
fighting skills," but a man "willing and able to maintain an independent position, aiding both the processes of government and
the desires of individuals, but dependent on neither."
This can be accomplished within the framework of existing
curricula and amendments thereof which may be made from time
to time the better to adjust it to the then needs of the community. It may require a greater recognition of the areas of legal
history and jurisprudence in the curriculum to fill in for the
materials which no longer have any living force of their own and
which have to be sacrificed for those that do, but which were the
vehicle for the sense of continuity which Judge Goodrich had in
mind. Possibly it could be achieved by no formal course revisions whatever. It could be accomplished, in part, with nothing
more than the rediscovery by law teachers of the role of law in
society, the traditional role of the lawyer in the public service,
and the essential place of an alert and informed bar in a democratic society.
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